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FAR EASTERN SECTION
THE LEGAL NATURE OF SOVIET COLLECTIVE FARMS
GEORGE C. GUINS*S OVIET legislation concerning collective farms (kolkhozes) reveals in
an exceptionally clear manner all the peculiarities of the central-
ized economy.
As a legal entity a kolkhoz owns its "socialist property," but this
does not include the most valuable element of agricultural economy,
that is, the land. Members of collective farms work on land which
belongs to the state. Even the house and garden plots which are placed
at the disposal of individual farmers and their families do not belong
to them.' Actually, only the surplus production belongs to the kol-
khozes and they may dispose of it as they see fit, selling it, for example,
in the open market.
Thus a kolkhoz is an institution of public rather than private law.
Similarily to the trests and torgs, kolkhozes are organized for the
purpose of carrying out an important part of the state's national plan.2
They perform the public function of supplying the socialist state with
agricultural products. The organization of kolkhozes, with their duties
and activities, is determined by the charter of an agricultural artel
which was approved by the second convention of Shock Workers of the
Collective Farms and confirmed on February 17, 1935, by the Council
of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., and by the Central Committee
of the All-Union Communist Party (CC of the ACP(b) ).'
Theoretically, kolkhozes are voluntarily organized co6peratives
(artels) but actually, their organization was required by the govern-
* Magister of Civil Law, Lectures in Political Science and Slavic Languages,
University of California.
1 "The land, its natural deposits, waters, forests . . belong to the whole people."
Art. 6 of the Constitution of 1936.
2 "The artel binds itself to conduct its collective farming according to plan, observ-
ing exactly the plans of agricultural production drawn up by the agencies of the
workers' and peasants' government, and the duties of the artel toward the government."
"The artel shall accept for precise execution the programs of sowing, fallow
ploughing, weeding, harvesting, threshing, and autumn ploughing prescribed in con-
sideration of the condition and peculiarities of collective farms, and also the govern-
ment plan for the development of stock breeding." Art. 6 of the Standard Charter of an
Agricultural Artel of February 17, 1935.
3 The Charter is translated by V. Gsovski and is included in his II Soviet Civil
Law, pp. 441-462.
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ment. For evidence of this we need only to refer to Stalin's famous
article, "Dizziness of Success" (March 2, 1930), in which he repri-
manded the local agencies for overdoing the organizing of the kol-
khozes, abusing coercion, and rushing on ahead without the necessary
contact with the masses. The belated resolution of the XVIth Congress
of the Communist Party, which declared that "kolkhozes can be organ-
ized on a voluntary basis only," obviously contradicted the preceding
practice with its prosecutions of wealthy peasant individualists.
While the formation of kolkhozes may be instigated or even forced
by the government, their liquidation is impossible other than by means
of law. The permanent character of collective farms is indirectly ex-
pressed in the Constitution which provides kolkhozes with "land for
ever.")4
The public character of kolkhozes as economic organizations of the
Soviet state is clearly expressed in the provisions of the charter of an
agricultural artel.5
I
As organizations of great public significance, kolkhozes are subject
to the control of various government and Party organs.6
The Machine Tractor Station (M.T.S.) not only assists the kol-
khozes but also controls their activity and attitudes. For this purpose
the CC of the ACP(b) decided, in 1947, to establish a new post in the
Machine Tractor Stations, namely, Assistant Director in charge of
Political Activities, whose duties are "to insure the improvement of the
work of the party organizations of the M.T.S. and to expand political
education work among tractor and combine mechanics, and other
4 "The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them for their use free of
charge and for an unlimited time, that is, for ever." Art. 8 of the Constitution of 1936.
5 "The toiling peasants of the village [settlement, hamlet, khutor, kishlak, aul]
of ............... in the district of ................ voluntarily band together into an agricultural
artel in order to establish, with common means of production and with organized com-
mon labor, a collective, i.e., a joint farm, to insure complete victory over the kulak,
over all the exploiters and enemies of the toilers, over want and ignorance, over the
backwardness of small individual farms, to create high productivity of labor, and, by
this means, to insure the well-being of the members."
"The path of collective farming, the path of socialism, is the only right path
for the toiling peasants. The members of the artel take upon themselves the obligation
to strengthen their artel, to work honestly, to distribute the collective farm income
according to the amount of work done, to guard the common property, to take care
of the collective farm property, to keep the tractors and machinery in good order,
to tend the horses carefully, to execute the tasks imposed by the workers' and peasants'
government in order to make theirs a bolshevist collective farm and all it members
prosperous." Art. 1 of the Charter.
8The organization of control over the kolkhozes is described by A. Vucinich in
The Kolkhoz: its Social Structure and Development, The American Slavic and
East-Eutropean Review (February, 1949).
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workers of the M.T.S."7 Having a strong Communist nucleus in its
organization, local M.T.S., under the leadership of Party organs and in
co~peration with the Communists inside the kolkhoz, can control the
activity of the Communists
Besides the Communists of the kolkhoz and M.T.S., secretaries of
the district Communist Party committees, presidents of the district
executive committees, and other Party and government officers are
responsible for the realization of the government and Party instruc-
tions and orders.' The administrative personnel of the kolkhozes is
treated as though it consisted of government officials.
Andreev, a member of the Politbureau, in a report to the Plenum of
the CC of the ACP(b) in February, 1947, criticized the existing prac-
tice of ousting administrative personnel of the kolkhozes and M.T.S.
He said that in the Kostroma region, for instance, 50 per cent of the
chairmen were dismissed in 1946; in the Kuibyshev region, 540 chair-
men in 1945; in the Penza region, fifty-four directors of the M.T.S. out
of 115 were dismissed. Although this practice was then condemned,'
it illustrates how illusory is the self-government of the kolkhozes.
Among the government organizations under whose control and lead-
ership are found the kolkhozes, the closest to them are the village
soviets. A village soviet has the right to hear kolkhoze reports and to
suspend its resolutions if it finds them illegal. In the latter case the
village soviet presents the matter to the Raisoviet (District Soviet of
the Working People's Deputies) which has the right to abrogate
kolkhoz resolutions. The local soviets are also vested with the responsi-
bility of securing control over the kolkhoz in order to see that it carries
out the state plan for agricultural produce and cattle breeding and
observes the provisions of the charter.
7 Resolution X of the CC of the ACP (b), Izvestia, Feb. 28, 1947.
8 A kolkhoz as a co~perative organization (artel) must have "the leading core"
in the person of the Communist organization as have "all organizations of the working
people, both public and state." Art. 126 of the Constitution.
9 Point 4 of the Resolution of the CC of the ACP (b) of May 27, 1939, concerning
Measures to Protect the Collective Farm from Diversion. (See II GsovsKI, op. cit.,
supra, note 3, at 478.)
By the Decree of Sept. 19, 1946, it was confirmed that "It shall be the duty of the
leaders of the Party and Soviet organizations, as well as of the leaders of the regional
and provincial organizations to restore the full effect of the Resolution of May 27, 1939."
(See II Gsovsxi, op. cit., supra, note 3, at 494-495.)
10 "The regional and district committees often resort to mass replacement of
workers. Great fluidity has been observed in a number of districts. In other places
penalties are abused. It is easy to relieve the president of a backward kolkhoz of his
duties; it is harder to teach him the art of managing the complex economy of an agri-
cultural artel. If penalties are abused they cease to be a medium of education, a means
of spurring on the lagging workers." Pravda, editorial, May 18, 1947.
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The fundamental duty of village soviets and Raisoviets is to see that
the charter is observed. They are also obliged, however, to assist the
kolkhozes in all their economic activity with the intention of strength-
ening them, protecting their property, and bringing about a successful
achievement of their plans and undertakings."
The direct leadership for the economic activity of the kolkhozes,
however, belongs to the District Agricultural Bureaus (Raiotdel Sels-
kogo Khoziastva). They have to assist the kolkhozes in the organiza-
tion of management, as far as the selection of cadres is concerned, in
making and carrying out plans of production and estimates, as well as
in increasing efficiency in labor and absorbing advanced methods of
agricultural economy. 2
Besides the above described dependence of kolkhozes on Party or-
ganizations, local soviets, and other government agencies, they are also
under the general leadership of the Ministry of Agriculture of the
U.S.S.R." and of the newly organized Council on Collective Farms.
The Council is composed of men who have a great deal of experience
in farm management, and of persons from various sections of the
country who are familiar with specific local problems of the Ukraine,
Siberia, Armenia, Turkestan, etc. 4 The Council must provide incen-
tives to stimulate the interest and efforts of the members of the col-
lective farms, must support discipline, and protect the principles of
"self-government," as well as promote the just distribution of profits.
The Council has to protect kolkhozes from grabbers and parasites.
The reference to "grabbers" and "parasites" has a double signifi-
cance. In the first place it points out the widespread abuse of power
by the party workers who direct the kolkhozes. Secondly, it indicates
a struggle against the excessive growth of the administrative personnel
-growth at the expense of the productive and responsible workers."
11 "The local soviets, including the village soviets, have every possibility of becom-
ing leaders of kolkhozes." Osnovy Sovekskogo Gosudarstva i Prava, Izdanie Minis-
teestva Iustitsii, M. 1947, p. 481.
22 Id. at 482.
'. In 1940, the Commissariat of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. issued 1,113,000 letters,
orders, decisions, regulations, and instructions. Izvestia, March 11, 1941.
'14 Moscow News, October 12, 1946.
15 The Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. emphasized in its Decree of September
19, 1946, the undesirability. of "unfounded and extravagant increase of administrative
and managerial jobs," "artificially invented jobs avoiding productive work" and "kept
at the expense of the collective farms," and ordered to have cut "artificially boosted
appropriations" and "the expenses for business management." (The full text of the
Decree is in II Gsovsia, op. cit., supra, note 3, No. 35, pp. 487-497).
In total, Soviet farmers maintain not less than five million people composing the
administrative and technical personnel which is closely connected with the kolkhoz
economy. After the Decree of Sept., 1946, in one year 535,000 top-heavy personnel of
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The government's measures against the excessive bureaucratism in
the agricultural economy, as well as its efforts to decrease the high
overhead of the kolkhozes for the maintenance of a huge administrative
personnel, are futile, as bureaucratism and an augmented apparatus
of management are inherent in the centralized economy as such.
II
Economically the kolkhozes are still more dependent on the govern-
ment than on their own management. The most important source of
their existence-the land-belongs to the state, and the exploitation of
this land is predetermined by the national plan. Every kolkhoz receives
orders which are part of the government plan and must carry them out
under the supervision of the above-mentioned agencies.
The elected administration of a kolkhoz is in fact at the service of
the state. As we have seen, chairmen of kolkhozes are ousted without
much ado-merely if they do not serve a given purpose. Elections
serve only to indicate to the authorities the people who can do the job.
Candidates are mostly approved in advance by the local soviets.
The most important difference between kolkhozes and other eco-
nomic agencies of the Soviet state, namely, trests and torgs, consists,
as said before, in the right of the kolkhozes to have their own "social-
ist property."'" One section of this property-livestock, implements,
buildings-has an accessorial character in agricultural economy and is
in fact an essential element in carrying out government assignments.
A kolkhoz may not dispose of this property. It cannot sell, for instance,
its "own" implements, horses, or buildings. This is possible neither
formally nor practically. It is impossible formally since the sale of
implements, livestock, or buildings would stop the work and make
impossible the completion of planned assignments. Such a transaction,
which would be obviously prejudicial to the state and to socialism,
cannot have any effect." But should such a transaction be concluded,
then not only the contracting parties but also the supervising bodies
the kolkhozes, and 213,000 persons having no relation to actual kolkhoz work, (a total
of 748,000 people) were removed from the pay rolls. Pravda, editorial, September
19, 1947.
16 "The common enterprises of collective farms and co6perative organizations, with
their livestock and implements, the products of the collective farms and co~perative
organizations, as well as their common buildings, constitute the common socialist
property of the collective farms and co6perative organizations." Art. 7 of the Civil Code.
17 "A legal transaction made for a purpose contrary to law, or in fraud of law, as
well as a transaction directed to the obvious prejudice of the state, shall be invalid."
Art. 30 of the Civil Code.
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would certainly be prosecuted as "enemies of the people" with all the
drastic consequences of this paramount crime."
Practically a kolkhoz cannot sell its implements, livestock, etc., for
without them it could not continue its economy. Neither can it sell its
property and liquidate its economy in bulk, because it would then
deprive itself of the means of existence. 9 Peasants, like all citizens in
the Soviet Union, cannot move freely in the country because of the
passport problem and are not permitted to choose a job without ap-
proval of the authorities.
To the second category of the "kolkhoz socialist property" belong
the products of the collective farms. This property is theoretically at
the free disposal of the kolkhozes. This freedom is, however, only
apparent. Kolkhozes must supply the state with agricultural products,
and they are compelled to make deliveries of these products. Therefore,
they may dispose of only surplus produce, which is in fact the farmers'
remuneration for their work for the state.
Thus the "kolkhoz socialist property," as a component part of the
socialist planned economy, cannot be disposed of at the discretion of
collective farms and is in fact a "fettered property." It differs essen-
tially from the private property of legal entities. It is rather a part of
national property allotted to the kolkhozes, ° in addition to the land for
the development of their agricultural economy in the interests of the
nation.
The only difference between the "state socialist property" and the
"kolkhoz socialist property" is found in the system of exploitation and
management. In contrast to the workers of state factories and mines,
the members of kolkhozes do not receive wages. As compensation they
have at their disposal some part of the "socialist property." This means
that their existence depends wholly on the result of their work. Not
only the managers, as in a factory, but all farmers are responsible for
the effectiveness of their work inasmuch as their share depends on
'is Art. 18 of the Charter of Collective Farms and Art. 58 of the Penal Code.
19 There are in practice, transactions concluded by the kolkhozes for the sale of
some parts of their property, especially of the young of livestock. Andreev in his above
cited report remarks that "cattle breeding is conducted negligently," "pigs are wasted
like small change."
20 The government has generously transferred to the kolkhozes the confiscated
property of the kulaks, valued at more than 400,000 rubles. Osnovy Sovetskogo Gosu-
darsiva i Prava, Institut Prava Nauk S.S.S.R., M. 1947, pp. 486-487.
In the Soviet Union, kidaks are those farmers, mostly wealthy peasants, the most
industrious, thrifty, and skillful, who opposed the collectivization and were dekulakized,
i.e., deprived of their property and banished to remote parts of the country to work at
forced labor.
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what they produce. Their only chance then to better their condition in
life is to have a rich harvest of produce.
Because of the difference in the system of remuneration, the admin-
istrative and economic power in regard to the kolkhozes is not concen-
trated indivisibly in the hands of the state, as happens in the case of
"state socialist property."'"
Members of collective farms, in spite of the risk they take, are never-
theless limited in their economic activity by the planning system, by
special controls, and by their dependence on different institutions sup-
plying them with equipment, seeds, credits, and agronomic assistance.
The kolkhoz economy is organized on the basis of an interlocking
dependence. An individual farmer depends on the kolkhoz, and the
kolkhoz on the M.T.S., a purely governmental organization. An in-
dividual farmer as a rule does not own a horse or any breeding cattle,
and he is not allowed to produce grain on his house and garden plot of
land. A kolkhoz cannot own tractors or combines, but must rent them
from the M.T.S., just as an individual farmer must rent from the
kolkhoz horses for work and transportation, and studhorses for breed-
ing.
III
The efficiency of the kolkhoz economy depends not so much on the
organization of the management as on the economic stimuli for efficient
work, which in turn depends first and foremost on the distribution of
income and the share the farmers have in this distribution.
According to Article 11 of the Standard Charter, every kolkhoz is
obliged, above all, to cover its debts to the government. Accordingly,
it must deliver a part of its produce to the government as payment for
various supplies and a part to the M.T.S. for its work in the kolkhoz.
The kolkhoz is further obliged-and this is its heaviest obligation-to
deliver to the government a specific quantity of produce. The amount
of these deliveries is determined without correlation to the actual
harvest but to the harvest which should have theoretically been ob-
tained from all the arable land at the disposal of a given kolkhoz rather
than from the sown area only.22
21 A. Venediktov, p. 321.
22 The decree of the Council of Ministers and the CC of the ACP (b) of April 6,
1940.
"The collective farms were obliged to contribute to the state a certain percentage,
not of their crop, but of the harvest which they theoretically should have received from
their sown area. In this way the collective farms were forced to struggle for a good
yield per acre, or they might not have enough bread to last them through the winter.
FAR EASTERN SECTION 73
The reason for this system is to encourage members of kolkhozes to
till and sow all the arable land in order to get a larger crop. After dis-
cussion by the Plenum of the Communist Party in February, 1947, it
was decided to continue this method of computing quotas of deliveries,
as being the best incentive to increase acreage. The only amendment
approved by the Party Plenum at its conference in February, 1947,
consists in permitting the reduction of deliveries of a kolkhoz possess-
ing a large tract of land when it is short of manpower.3
Thus all contributions in kind are levied on the kolkhoz according
to the area at its disposal, regardless of what part of it is actually being
tilled. On the basis of these regulations, if a kolkhoz extends its tillage,
it has an opportunity to increase its own share, as the assessment re-
mains the same. On the other hand, the share of the government and of
the M.T.S. in the produce of a kolkhoz always consists of a high per-
centage of the crop, and is equivalent to a lion's share in case of
drought and poor harvest, while the farmer's share increases in case
of a rich harvest. Climatic conditions may impair the position of the
farmers but never of the state.
The deliveries to the state are compulsory.24 They and the prices
paid to the kolkhozes for them are fixed by the government. The norms
for delivery are excessively high while the prices are too low. There-
fore, the obligation to make deliveries is considered as the heaviest
kind of taxation.
After all deliveries to the government have been made, the kolkhoz,
before disposing of its own share, must set aside a certain quantity for
seed and forage reserves, in accordance with the government sowing
Since the spring of 1940, however, the process has gone one step further. The collec-
tive farms were required to contribute a certain percentage of the theoretical harvest
from all arable land at their disposal. It thus became the duty of the president of the
collective farm to see that all his arable land was sown if he wanted to have enough
bread for the winter. Decrees of this nature had been published applying to grain, meats,
dairy products, hemp, flax, wool, fruits, and truckgarden products. The entire Soviet
agricultural system was speeded up." "This I explained in detail to the newly arrived
[Yugoslav Ambassador] Gabrilovich. He would not believe me. 'It is impossible,' he
said. No peasants would stand such regulations."' JOHN ScoTr, DUEL FOR EUaoP
(Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston. 1942). p. 128.
23 Resolution IX of the Plenum of the CC of the ACP (b). Feb. 1947. (See note 7,
supra.)
24 "The legal norms concerning compulsory deliveries of the agricultural products
do not regulate the relations of material character only, but also the relations bused on
power and submission." Prof. M. M. Agarkov, "Fundamental Problems of the Soviet
Civil Law," Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo, No. 3, 1947, p. 36. See also Prof. Karass,
"Ob Obiazatelstvakh po Postavke Gosudarstvu Selsokokhoziastvennoi Produktsii,
ibid., No. 3, 1947, p. 51 (note 29).
The norms of compulsory deliveries were established at first in 1932 for grain,
and later, for meat, dairy products and industrial crops. See references in I Gsovosxi,
op. cit., supra, note 3, at 738-740.
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plans.2 1 Only then can the remainder of the produce be partly sold by
the kolkhoz and partly distributed among the collective farmers.
Theoretically, deliveries definitely fixed for a kolkhoz exclude all
other obligations in kind. However, the state has at its disposal various
ways for increasing its share. First of all, local soviets and Party organs
inspire kolkhozes to take upon themselves a voluntary obligation, sol-
emnly voted by the general assemblies, to increase production and to
deliver to the state more than is assigned. Every year, since 1947,
Izvestia and Pravda have widely opened their pages to the solemn
pledges of kolkhozes, addressed to Stalin, to fulfill conscientiously their
obligation to produce more and to deliver more to the state. This sys-
tem is characterized in the Soviet Union as one of the manifestations
of the "socialist competition."
Being a universal monopolist, the Soviet state has also another means
for getting more agricultural products from its farmers. There are
always different shortages on the market, and it depends completely
on the state to supply its special organs and co~peratives with the short
commodities for the purpose of exchanging them for agricultural prod-
ucts. The organs of the Ministry of Food Reserves of the U.S.S.R., in
whose competence it is to secure stock-piling of different agricultural
products, like Zagotzerno (grain procurement administration), and the
co~peratives supplied with the products of industry, acquire surpluses
of agricultural produce for relatively low prices or on the basis of bar-
ter. Needless to say, these operations are more profitable for the state
than for the kolkhozes of individual farmers, as the conditions of
exchange are dictated and there is no choice for the farmers.26
The system for distributing such agricultural products as meat, wool,
dairy produce, and technical crops (cotton, flax, hemp, sugar beets)
is the same as that for grain distribution. The norms for the compulsory
deliveries of all these products were established in 1940, on the same
basis as the deliveries of grain-that is, in accordance with potential
and not actual production. For instance, deliveries of meat are deter-
mined not by the actual size of the collective herd, but on the basis of
the combined acreage of tillable land and pastures held by the farm.
The norms remain the same if a kolkhoz increases the number of its
25 Decree of the Council of Ministries and of the CC of the ACP (b) July 28, 1947.
26 The circle of trading enterprises and especially the operations of the producers'
and consumers' co~peratives was widened by the decree of Nov. 9, 1946, and as Pravda
explained (Nov. 11, 1946), the Soviet government expected the producers' co6peratives
to be able to supply the village with various kinds of household utensils and articles
which the state industries do not produce at all or produce in insufficient quantity, and
the village to give its surplus produce in exchange.
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animals; thus the more animals a kolkhoz possesses, the more benefit
to it. The Soviet government and the Party take for granted that this
is the best stimulus for the development of collective agriculture and
husbandry."'
In addition to the compulsory deliveries, as described above, the
Soviet government applies also the so-called kontraktatsia system,
which is a special kind of contract requiring kolkhozes to deliver meat
or certain kinds of crops. These contracts usually require the applica-
tion of new methods and measures of an agricultural character designed
to raise production or improve the quality of produce. The govern-
ment agencies, as another party of the contract, are obliged to supply
kolkhozes with seeds, machines or spare parts, fertilizers, credits, and
even with some of the commodities of which the market happens to be
short.
IV
While the state's share in the agricultural production of a kolkhoz is
determined in absolute figures, the individual members of a collective
farm are remunerated according to the quantity of produce which re-
mains after all compulsory deliveries and required storage reserves are
provided for.
Remuneration of individual farmers depends on the number of "la-
bor days" credited to them. A "labor day" is a conditional unit. During
one calendar day a member of the collective farm may earn several
"labor days" or only a fraction of a "labor day," depending upon the
type of work done and the results achieved.
For instance, according to the practice of many kolkhozes, reaping
harvest from one acre is one labor day unit; one calendar day's work
of a watchman is .3 labor day, and of a chairman of the kolkhoz, three
labor days. For every kind of work there is a special kind of norm, but
the final amount of remuneration is indefinite until the moment of dis-
tribution, as the share of each member depends as much on the number
27 Before 1939-1940, when deliveries of grain were established in proportion with
the sown area (see supra, notes 22 and 24) the quality of meat and dairy products to be
delivered to the state by kolkhozes was determined according to the number of head
of livestock. In spite of the subsequent changes of the conditions for the delivery of
these products, calculations and reckonings of the government proved, evidently, to be
wrong and the results of the deliveries did not meet with anticipations. Consequently,
in April, 1950, a new three-year plan for the development of the cattle-breeding industry
was approved (Sotsialisticheskoe Zeinledelie, April 19, 1949) and the new norms and
regulations about deliveries of meat and dairy products 'were established (Vedonzosti
Verkhovnogo Soveta, April 30, 1949. No. 19, May 28, 1949; No. 25, July 3, 1949;
No. 31).
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of his labor days during the year as on the quantity of the surplus
which remains at the disposal of a kolkhoz.
Some farmers might prefer not to earn many labor days in their
kolkhoz and work on their plots of land or elsewhere instead. It was
stated that in contrast to members who earn as many as from 200 to
600 labor days, there are others who have no more than twenty to
thirty labor days credited to them annually. Therefore, an obligatory
minimum of from sixty to one hundred labor days was established in
1939,28 and increased in 1942.29
V
A very important provision of the kolkhoz legislation is the right
given to farmers to cultivate individual plots of land, the so-called
house-and-garden plots. Not being very confident of the results of his
work in the kolkhoz, every member of the collective farm is interested
in his household enterprise on the small plot of land assigned to him
and to his family. The size of this plot varies in conformity with local
conditions of the agricultural economy, but is not less than .62 of an
acre and only in a few districts more than 1.24 acres.
The private farming economy is limited not only by the size of the
plot at the disposal of the dvor (peasant family) but also by its special
use, as, for instance, a vegetable garden or orchard."0
The number of animals which may be owned privately by each farm
is also limited. It is sufficiently large in nomadic districts, less in semi-
nomadic or nonnomadic districts, where agriculture is of small impor-
tance, but in the greater part of European Russia each household may
have in its individual possession "one cow, not more than two calves,
one sow with sucklings, not more than ten sheep and goats altogether,
an unlimited number of fowl and rabbits, and not more than twenty
beehives."'"
In spite of all limitations the small household enterprises of the
members of the collective farms not only feed the farmers and their
families but also serve a general need. They are not only a form of
28Joint Resolutoin of the CC of the ACP (b) and the U.S.S.R. Council of People's
Commissars of May 27, 1939. See II Gsovsxi, op. cit., supra, note 3, No. 33, § 14.
29 Joint Resolution ordering an increase in the obligatory Minimum of Labor Days
for Collective Farmers, of April 13, 1942. II GsovsKI, op. cit., supra, note 3, No. 34.
This law, although issued for the period of the war, had not been abrogated, according
to the Resolution of the Plenum of the CC of the ACP (b) in February, 1947.
30 Standard Chapter, Sec. 2, par. 4: "Farmers should abstain from raising field
crops such as rye or wheat on their private plots." (See I GsovsKi, op. cit., supra,
note 3, p. 769 and references ibid., note 5).
s1 Standard Chapter, Section 5.
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additional remuneration to farmers but also a means of producing
vegetables, fruits, technical crops, eggs, etc.-items not usually pro-
duced by the kolkhozes and for which an industry on a large scale is
not everywhere possible.
Nevertheless, the character of the household enterprise is too in-
dividualistic. It does not agree with the collectivism of kolkhozes and
is not supported by the socialist state, which highly taxes the income
from household deliveries of vegetables, meat, milk, etc. 2 Indirectly
the government compels farmers to sell their products to kolkhozes by
requiring them to make such deliveries (of meat, for instance) that
they cannot help but purchase from individual farmers. If a kolkhoz
buys meat elsewhere or pays too high a price for it, the losses of this
kolkhoz are none the less losses of the farmers.
However, the household economy has developed very successfully.
Farmers are working industriously and willingly on their small plots
which, as a matter of fact, support them during the more unsuccessful
years. When possible farmers try to expand their house-and-garden
plots on account of the collectively held fields. They consider their
plots as their own property and dispose of them as such, forgetting that
land cannot become private property in the Soviet Union and that
their plots are a part of the collective farm's land. One of the resolu-
tions in which these trends were pointed out says that "in a number of
collective farms, the practice is really to transform the house-and-
garden plot into the private property of the household, so that not the
collective farm but the individual member of the collective farm dis-
poses of it at his own discretion, i.e., rents it or retains the plot for his
own use, although he himself does not work in the collective farm.""3
Having prohibited for the future any attempt to reduce the col-
lectively used land for the benefit of individual husbandry, as well as
any increase of privately held plots in excess of the size provided for
by the Standard Charter, the resolution dictated the elimination of all
land surpluses from the house-and-garden plots, the withdrawal from
personal use of all land apart from house lots, such as vegetable gar-
den, watermelon patches, levada, and the like, and the liquidation of
A new and very high taxation was established by the Ukase of July 13, 1948. This
applied especially to incomes from the household economy of members of kolkhozes.
33 Resolution of the CC of the ACP (b) and the U.S.S.R. Council of People's Com-
missars of May 27, 1939, concerning Measures to Protect the Collectively Held Fields
of the Collective Farms from Diversion. U.S.S.R. LAws 1939, text 235. II Gsovsxa, op.
cit., supra, note 3, No. 33.
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house-and-garden plots of the enclosure type (khutor) located in the
midst of collectively held fields. 4
Seven years later the Soviet government and the Party in their Reso-
lution of September 19, 1946," 5 quoted above, had to reiterate that
squandering of collective fields occurs along the line of enlargement of the
house-and-garden plots of collective farmers by means of unauthorized
seizures or illegal additions made by the management and the chairmen of
collective farms to advance personal farming to the detriment of collective
farming.
According to Andreev's report in February, 1947, 1,800,000 hectares
(about 4,500,000 acres) were withdrawn from "illegal use" and re-
turned to 80,000 kolkhozes, in conformity with the Resolution of Sep-
tember 19, 1946.
The Soviet government not only protects collective farms from
different violations, but it tries to stimulate directly or indirectly their
development in the interests of the formers. For instance, after the
issuing of a three-year plan of the development of cattle-breeding, 6
the government has established new norms for the compulsory de-
liveries of meat, 7 and these norms became in practice higher for the
individual households than for the kolkhozes. At the same time kol-
khozes are required to increase the number of their cattle and for this
purpose to acquire young animals. They can do this only by buying
them from the individual farmers. The government's policy is clear.
It desires to intensify the activity of kolkhozes and strengthen the
dependence of individual farmers on the collective farms.
VI
Individualistic trends among the collective farmers are held by the
government to be a definite survival of private property psychology
and are therefore condemned as
the interests of the collective farming, the basis of which is the fields held
by the collective farms, are sacrificed to the elements of private ownership
and avarice, which abuse the collective farms for the purpose of speculation
and personal profit.88
84 The same Resolution, Sections 3 and 7.
35 Resolution concerning Measures to Be Taken for the Liquidation of Violations of
the Charter of an Agricultural Artel in the Collective Farms. II Gsovsyr, op. cit.,
supra, note 3, No. 35.
86 The "Three-Year Plan of the Development of the Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz Cattle-
Breeding. 1949-51." Resolution of the Soviet of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the
CC of the ACP (b). Sotsialisticheskoe Zemledelie, April 19, 1949, No. 91.
37 Decree of May 25, 1949 (Sotsialisticheskoe Zemledelie, May 26, 1949).
38 This quotation from the Resolution of May 27, 1939, was replaced by the text
of the Resolution of Sept. 19, 1946. (See II Gsovsici, op. cit., supra, note 3, at 490.)
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Despite a growing political and social awareness there are still "background
elements" and even now "the idea of private property is strong."89
The Soviet government, nevertheless, firmly believes in kolkhozes
and consistently strengthens and expands the collective farming, which
it considers as one of the most important measures leading to the final
victory of socialism."'
The collectivization of agriculture is at present an actual problem
of the Soviet government in all the countries annexed after World War
II: in Bessarabia, the western regions of Byelorussia, and the Ukraine,
in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. 1
The satellites are also encouraged to undertake and hasten the or-
ganization of kolkhozes.
VII
It is still difficult for the Soviet government to overcome the resist-
ance and inertia of farmers, and it needs special measures to encourage
the loyal elements and suppress opponents.
On March 29, 1947, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet issued an
order in regard to conferring the title "Hero of Socialist Labor" and
the awarding of orders and medals of the U.S.S.R. to kolkhoz, M.T.S.,
and sovkhoz workers as a premium for obtaining large crops of wheat,
rye, corn, sugar beets, and cotton. Pravda remarked that only in the
Soviet Union is such attention paid to the "working man.)42
The system of encouraging industriousness among farmers by in-
dividual rewards for record harvests was extended still further by the
decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on April 24, 1948. This
decree established various indices for wheat, rye, corn, rice, cotton,
sugar beet, sunflower, clover, lucerne, and timothy grass harvests.
Indices are different for different regions, and the law specifies which
21 Bolshevik, August, 1946. Cf. "In the Bashkir Autonomous Republic the state
production quotas have not been met. The explanation given is shortage of fuel, which
is untrue. It is not because of lack of fuel but of the anti-government attitudes which
exist in the region." Pravda, Oct. 26, 1946.
40 The elimination of the kulaks, the most numerous of the exploiting classes, and
the adoption of collective farming by the bulk of the peasants led to the destruction
of the last roots of capitalism in the country, to the final victory of socialism in agri-
culture, and to the complete consolidation of the Soviet power in the countryside."
HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION. (International Publishers,
New York. 1939.) p. 329.
41 N. D. Kazantsev, "Zakonodatelnye Osnovy Zemelnykh Otnoshenii v. S.S.S.R."
-westia Akademii Nauk SSSR Otdel Ekonomiki i Prava. M. 1948, No. 5.
42Pravda, March 31, 1947. Also the article "Stalinski Premii" (Stalin Prizes for
Achievement and Work in the Field of Agricultural Economy) Sotsialisticheskoe
Zemledelie, April 9 and 10, 1949.
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of the four possible rewards can be received by farmers if the harvest
has reached or surpassed these indices. This system of rewards cer-
tainly expands the economic differentiation among peasants and pro-
vides incentive hardly in line with collective philosophy.
The same policy was applied and enlarged in 1949, when indices of
cattle-breeding and of large harvests of some technical crops were
established." The Soviet newspapers are full of the conferring of titles
and medals awarded to farmers who proved worthy of them in reaching
or surpassing the established indices.
The system of making generous rewards as a means of encourage-
ment is probably more effective at present than the application of
penalties against the idle or disloyal kolkhoz members. Nevertheless,
this latter system must not be ignored.
The mildest method of repression to be applied is contained in a
disciplinary order." This method is applied by the kolkhoz itself. An-
other measure at the disposal of a kolkhoz is the expulsion of its mem-
bers from the collective farms. This punitive step was evidently abused
and the government prohibited its employment unless a member proved
to be "incorrigible, subversive, and disruptive to the collective farm,"
and only after all preventive and educational measures provided for
in the charter had been exhausted. Moreover, the decision ordering
expulsion cannot be put into effect until the district executive commit-
tee has made the final judgment on the decision.
The limitation of the right and practice of expulsion from collective
farms was addressed to those leaders of such farms who "fail to realize
that expulsion from a collective farm means to the one expelled depri-
vation of his source of subsistence; it means not only exposure to dis-
grace in public opinion, but also condemnation to starvation.""
Expulsion really creates disastrous conditions for an expelled mem-
ber, since according to existing regulations he receives only a very
43 Ukase of April 20, 1949, on Indices in Cattle-Breeding (Vedornosti Verkhovnogo
Soveta, April 30, 1949, No. 19) ; Ukase of May 20, 1949, on High Harvest of Cotton
(Vedomosti, May 28, 1949, No 25) ; Ukase on Indices of Jute Produce (Vedomosti,
July 3, 1949, No. 31).
44 "Members who fail to take good care of, or who neglect, the collective property,
who fail to report for work without a justifiable reason, who work badly, or who violate
labor discipline or the charter, shall be punished by the management in accordance
with the rules of internal organization. For example, such member may be ordered
to do the poor work over again without any credit in labor days. He may be warned,
reprimanded, or reproved at the general meeting, or his name may be put on the
blackboard. He may be fined up to five labor days; he may be demoted to a lower
paid job, or suspended from work." Art. 17. par. 2 of the Charter.
45 Resolution of April 19, 1938, Prohibiting Expulsion of Members from Collective
Farms. The full text is in II GsovsiI, op. cit., supra, note 3, No. 32.
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small part of the property contributed by him to the collective farm at
the moment of its organization or his becoming a member of it. The
initiation fee and the greater part (from one-half to three-quarters) of
his property which he transfers to the kolkhoz, such as cattle, agricul-
tural machines, if any, implements, and even building, become the
"indivisible capital" of the kolkhoz. Only the remainder, from one-
quarter to one-half of a member's contribution is assigned to the "share
capital" as a certain member's share. When leaving the kolkhoz, a
member's share is returned to him in the form of compensation accord-
ing to the fixed prices, which are always considerably lower than those
on the open market. Any increase in the working capital of the kolkhoz
belongs to it and is also indivisible.46
As a rule, the departing member of a collective farm also loses his
plot of land for household economy. 7 No wonder that he is deprived
"of his source of subsistence," as is correctly pointed out in the above
quoted official document.
Even more severe repressions against farmers are established by the
criminal law. Some acts committed by collective farmers, such as the
malicious slaughter or intentional maiming of livestock or horses, the
spoiling or damaging of any tractor, the criminally negligent handling
of any horse, are punishable according to the penal codes of the Union
of Soviet Republics."
The most drastic punishment threatens those members of collective
farms who are prosecuted for the pillage of socialist property as "a
betrayal of the common cause of the collective farm and aid to enemies
of the people." This crime is considered a counter-revolutionary act
and is punishable "with all the severity of the law"49 (the death pen-
alty, substituted by twenty-five year confinements according to the
law of May 26, 1947, and restored by the Ukase of January 12, 1950).
46 Art. 10 of the Charter.
47 "The departing member may obtain a land allotment only outside the land en-
closure belonging to the artel." Ibid. This regulation deprives even the member of a
collective farm who leaves voluntarily of the possibility to get a plot of land, since it is
practically impossible to get land outside the kolkhoz.
48 Art. 79 (1-4) of the Penal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.
49 Art. 18 of the Charter and Laws of Aug. 7, 1932, and of June 4, 1947.
"Judicial reprisals for the absence of kolkhoz members or their refusal to work are
to be taken either against persons who, while being absent, conduct propaganda against
the kolkhoz labor discipline and thus disintegrate the kolkhoz, or against kolkhoz
officials who do not combat the violators of labor discipline in the kolkhoz. In the first
case Art. 58-10 of the Criminal Code is to be applied." Ruling of the Supreme Court of
the R.S.F.S.R. of Nov. 24, 1933.
"Clandestine grist, even manual, in farms belonging to nontoilers and also by toilers,
if affected as a trade for profit entails punishment according to Art. 107 of the Criminal
Code," i.e. by deprivation of liberty for a period of not less than five years with the
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VIII
Collective farms, from both a technical and ethical point of view,
might be a progressive form of agricultural economy. As a co6perative,
a kolkhoz is supposed to have at its disposal modern agricultural equip-
ment, to utilize the organized assistance of agronomists, to apply ad-
vanced work methods, and to have all the advantages of a rational
division of labor. Undoubtedly there are in the Soviet Union some
prosperous and advanced kolkhozes which can be shown to be model
collective farms. Some of them are better equipped, some are closer to
large cities and consequently to the best markets, and some possess
lands of better quality. But in general, as the Soviet papers announce
annually and as statistical analysis of the results of collectivization
convincingly indicates, the kolkhozes are not as profitable as they were
supposed to be."
The reason for the failure of collectivization, from the point of view
of its returns, lies in the peculiarities of the centralized system of
economy and the nonconformity of its legal basis to actual human psy-
chology. Every kolkhoz is first of all a part of the huge economic
machinery of the integral planning system. The kolkhoz administration
is in turn a very small part of a huge bureaucratic apparatus submitted
to the control, supervision, and leadership of numerous economic, po-
litical, and administrative organs and agencies. Besides, a kolkhoz
depends economically on M.T.S., and the latter in turn, on various
industrial enterprises and shops. Every inefficiency or nonfulfillment of
the plan, for instance, in supplying machines or spare parts, or in the
repair of machines, causes a repercussion in the whole system.
Ix
Kolkhoz economy and the activities of members of collective farms
are regulated by public and not by private law. This is of paramount
significance. If a kolkhoz were really organized on a voluntary basis
and had in its possession the necessary machines, if it were vested with
the right to dispose freely of its produce as an independent subject of
private law, then it might be a very progressive agricultural organiza-
tion. But, on the contrary, it is not a voluntary organization, it does
confiscation of the entire property. Ruling of the Supreme Court of the R.S.F.S.R. of
Sept. 13, 1934.
50 The net agricultural production in the U.S.A. before the war was approximately
50 per cent higher than in the U.S.S.R., although the agricultural population of the
U.S.A. was only one-third of that of the U.S.S.R. The increase in profit does not cor-
respond to the increase in expenses. N. M. Yasny, "Akhillesova Piata Kolkhoznoi
sistemy." Novy Zhurnal, v. XIV, New York, 1943.
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not own the most important machines, and can dispose of but a small
part of the produce assigned to the members of a kolkhoz as their
remuneration, at its own discretion. To denominate a kolkhoz, Soviet
literature has established a Russian term-artel. This name is con-
stantly used in Soviet official documents, as well as in special economic
works. In Russian prerevolutionary law a typical form of artel was a
voluntary organization of several persons who joined together to carry
on certain kinds of work and earn money which they divided among
themselves according to their mutual agreement. Members of an artel
usually owned the necessary implements and were organized as a legal
entity with a chairman (starosta) and sometimes with a board of
directors at its head. Usually an artel did not work for itself but for
another party from whom it received remuneration.
A kolkhoz is also an artel sui generis. As a matter of fact, this defini-
tion illustrates its essential characteristics. The so-called property of
the collective farm is in reality a "socialist property" which cannot be
disposed of freely because of its special designation for the needs of
socialist economy. The farmers till, sow, and harvest certain parts of
the state land, divided into portions and distributed among numerous
artels. Members of collective artels (kolkhozes) receive remuneration
in the form of a share in produce. 1 This share, as we know, is mostly
too small, is insufficient for the existence of a farmer and his family,
and therefore, as an additional remuneration, farmers have house-and-
garden plots of land for their individual use. 2
However, a kolkhoz and an artel of prerevolutionary times differ
essentially as legal institutions. Both are legal entities, but the artel, as
a form of coiperative, was an organization of private law. The kolkhoz,
on the other hand, is an organization of public character. Like a trest
it is a government economic organization for fulfilling the agricultural
part of the national economic plan. For this reason a kollidoz cannot
help but be submitted, as it really is, to the government and Party.
agencies. For the same reason any violation of the rules and obligations
binding on the kolkhoz is considered a crime against the state ("a-
betrayal of the common cause" and "aid to enemies of the people").
51 The prerevolutionary practice was acquainted with the share-cropping, the so-
called ispolinaia arenda, land leased from squires in return for half of its produce
("ispolnaia"' means "half-half"). The squire's share was too great; nevertheless, both
squire and peasant divided profit and loss. The Soviet state, having a fixed amount of
the crops, runs no risk at all.
52 "For the satisfaction of consumer needs of a member of the kolkhoz until these
needs can be satisfied by the Kolkhoz." D. Shepelev. Sotsialisticheskaia Kolkhosnaia
Sobsivennost, 1940, p. 33.
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A kolkhoz, the same as any other organization of public law, cannot
be liquidated by a general assembly of its members. It cannot even
exclude a member without approval by the district executive com-
mittee. In fact, members of kolkhozes are attached to their farms and
cannot freely choose their residence or jobs.
There are some misleading expressions and formulations in Soviet
law which give a false idea of the real nature of kolkhozes. Thus Article
8 of the Constitution, for instance, declaring that "The land occupied
by collective farms is secured to their use free of charge," is not precise
because the land is given to a kolkhoz first and foremost for production
in the interests of the state. Hence it is the state which has to re-
munerate the farmers and guarantee their existence as its agricultural
workers, but the farmers are not debtors of the state who can be
charged for "the use" of land. Farmers work on the state's lands and
with the state's machines and give up to the state a fixed amount of
crops and other agricultural products. It is no less misleading when
kolkhozes are mentioned on a par with other co6perative organizations
which "may possess all kinds of property equally with private per-
sons."5  Almost the whole property of kolkhozes is "socialist property"
and not private property which they may possess "equally with private
persons." Collective farm property on a par with state property, is
"sacred and inviolable,"' 4 protected by the same penal law."' "Kolkhoz
socialist property" is a part of the national fund distributed among
250,000 artels for the fulfilling of some parts of the national plan.5"
X
To summarize, we may define a kolkhoz as an artel of farmers who
are compulsorily organized for agricultural work on a certain part of
the state land, in accordance with the state economic plan, and who
receive remuneration in the form of a share in their produce and the
right to independent but limited exploitation of house-and-garden plots.
Every kolkhoz is subject to numerous controlling and guiding organs
and regulations, and consequently to the inevitable bureaucratism in-
herent in the system of centralized economy. Agriculture, a branch of
economy which should be most flexible because of its very nature, be-
53 Art. 57 of the Civil Code.54 Art. 5 and 131 of the Constitution. "State property and kolkhoz co5perative prop-
erty are of the same type." A. Koshelev. Sotsialisticheskaia Sobstevennost, Ogiz, 1946,
p. 46.
55 Law of August 7, 1932.
56 Law of March 18, 1946, "on the Five-Year Plan for 1946-50." "The obligation to
deliver produce to the state arises from the basis of the economic plan-in other words,
from the system of regulated economy." Agarkov and others. CIVIL LAw TEXT=BOOK,
p.298 (1944).
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comes less successful, therefore, than it might be.
As an organization fulfilling certain public functions, a kolkhoz pre-
supposes a collective psychology on the part of its members. But this
psychology does not exist and cannot be created on order. Hence there
is a struggle of the farmers for more freedom and their devotion to
their individual plots of land. On the other hand there is the exertion
of the government to submit the kolkhozes to its sway. Hence the idle-
ness of the farmers and their lack of interest in harvests and machines
which do not belong to them; hence the futile efforts of the government
to overcome the peasants' individualism and to force them or encourage
them to give their solemn pledge to Stalin "to produce more and deliver
more to the state."
The history of Soviet legislation concerning kolkhozes shows an un-
interrupted struggle between the individualist trends of the peasantry
and the collectivist tendencies of socialism. Constant fluctuations char-
acterize this legislation. Now the government strengthens penalties,
now it distributes generous rewards, transforming additional and sub-
sidiary motives into the principal stimuli. Sometimes it tries to suppress
individualistic trends by force, sometimes it yields to the farmer's psy-
chology.
Undoubtedly rewards encourage the farmers to energetic efforts,
since the medals and honorary titles, as well as the material privileges
and donations, meet egoistic interests and motives half way. Besides
rewards, the Soviets in 1948 and 1949 applied one more measure which
again made a compromise with the individualistic psychology of the
farmers. Some. parts of the arable area in the use of a kolkhoz were
assigned to certain groups of farmers (zveno) for a special kind of
crop. In such cases the farmers composing the group did not receive
their reward on the basis of labor days but in a share of the harvest in
conformity with the efficiency of their work. They were thus interested
in the quality of the tillage, in timely sowing and harvesting, and in
careful storage. This measure was put into effect as an experiment in
a few kolkhozes. It transformed some kolkhoz farmers into what we
would call tenant farmers, those who give a share of the crop to the
landowner." Here the hidden essence of the kolkhoz as a state enter-
prise becomes more evident. This was at the same time another partial
return to the principles of private interests and a concession to the
psychology characterized in the Soviet press as petty bourgeois psy-
57 The experiment is described in the Sotsialisticheskoe Zemledelie, No. 18, January
22, 1948. The author of the article states that the experiment proved to be successful.
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chology. Its success should be another proof that labor on the basis of
private interest and individual independence and initiative is more
efficient than on the basis of compulsory collectivism. However, the
experiment, although approved by Andreev, a member of the Polit-
bureau, was flatly rejected by the Party at the beginning of 1950."
Almost simultaneously with the attack against Comrade Andreev's
utterances the Soviet papers began to propagate the necessity of the
"consolidating kolkhozes" (ukrupnenie kolkhozov). Misappropria-
tions, embezzlements, and other kinds of theft of kolkhoz property still
have been continued in spite of all measures applied by the C.P. and
the government. Many kolkhozes remained in great arrears to the
state in the delivery of agricultural products. For these reasons and
in order to achieve more proper organization of labor and the maximum
utilization of modern machinery the Politbureau has decided to tear
out any vestiges of peasants' individualism and to convert agricultural
labor into a type of industrial labor. This has to be achieved by the
consolidation of kolkhozes.
The new large farms are to be formed of each three, five, and even
more old ones. Villages are to be replaced with "agricultural towns."
All common buildings, inventories, cattle and other property become the
property of one consolidated kolkhoz. Peasants have to be resettled,
leaving their homes and house-and-garden plots of land, which they so
zealously cultivated. "Co6perative property" of kolkhozes is forcibly
merged; "personal property" of farmers' families is ignored. Under-
taking these measures "the Party of Lenin-Stalin is confidently leading
the Soviet people toward the victory of communism.""0 The advantage
of the large kolkhoz will be in "strengthening of socialist discipline,
fostering of communism in the soul of the peasant and the transforma-
tion of his psychology."'
1
The new reform, the "second collectivization," is carried out in a
blitz manner. Every step of planting, harvesting, livestock breeding,
etc. is regulated. The fictitious economic and administrative indepen-
dence of collective farms (agricultural artels) is strikingly uncovered;
the legal nature of Soviet Collective Farms, as government economic
organizations for fulfilling the agricultural part of the national eco-
nomic plan, becomes still more evident.
58 Pravda, editorial, February 19, 1950. See SoVIET PREss TRANSLATIONS, No. 8,
April 15, 1950.
59 Izvestia, March 31, April 27; Pravda, June 15, 1950, etc.
60 Pravda, February 19, 1950, Editorial.
61 Cf. Izvestia, November 22, 1950, p. 1.
